The extant literature on cultural transmission takes competing cultures in society as given and parental cultural preferences as fixed. We relax these assumptions by endogenizing both societal and parental preferences. We use smoking as a case-study of a cultural trait which did not always exist, and which over time has switched from being perceived as socially acceptable to being perceived as undesirable. In our model, parents' preferred cultural traits depend on the perceived health costs of smoking, and societal preferences depend on the behavior of a tobacco industry that aims to maximize smoking prevalence. We derive conditions for the emergence and persistence of the smoking habit, and find new implications for the relationship between parental and societal influences. We then test explicitly for the validity of our theoretical framework using novel US data. We find that our framework is able to capture features of smoking behavior which existing models are unable to explain.
Introduction
Cultural traits and norms, like risk-preferences, corruption, and altruism, are important in shaping individual economic behavior. The process by which such traits get transmitted from one generation to the next determines whether they survive and and how they are geographically distributed. In this study, we explain how cultures rst emerge in society and how they may persist across generations even when parental preferences change over time.
Our study adds to a growing economics literature that looks at the joint role of parental and social channels of cultural transmission.
Researchers from a wide range of scientic disciplines have long debated the nature/nurture question to evaluate the relative contribution of cultural (or environmental) and genetic eects on cognitive and psychological traits (Sacerdote 2011). Economists have also contributed to this debate, and have provided elaborate theory predicting that the genetic transmission of traits determines behavior (Robson and Samuelson 2011) . However, this literature generally concurs with the standard Darwinian prediction of the survival of the ttest, and is at odds with evidence for the resilience of minoritarian ethnic and religious traits, e.g. among the US immigrant population. Thè melting pot' hypothesis, which suggests that characteristics and traits of the immigrant population in the US will converge over time until they resemble those of the general population, is not consistent with observed patterns.
The observed behavior and characteristics of migrants conforms more closely to the`salad bowl' hypothesis, which suggests that dierent ethnic and minoritarian communities can simultaneously co-exist and maintain their respective cultural identities. In fact, norms in the country of immigrant origin are found to signicantly predict the behavior of second-and third-generation US immigrants (e.g Borjas 1992, Fernandez Bisin and Verdier (2001) developed a model in which children acquire traits either via societal role models or via parental socialization eorts. They assume that children are more likely to acquire a given trait the more prevalent that trait is in society, and that all parents want to transmit their own cultural trait to their children. Given these assumptions, their model identies a key feature of the social environment that ensures the co-existence of cultural traits in equilibrium. This property, which Bisin and Verdier term cultural 'substitutability', states that parents socialize their children less when their cultural trait is more prevalent in the population. Although ground-breaking, Bisin and Verdier's model fails to explain the persistence of traits that all parents want to avoid passing on to their children, even if they themselves possess them (e.g. insincerity, preferences for unprotected sex, substance use, low educational attainment). Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) address this failure by imposing that societal role models who belong to the minority group have a disproportionate inuence on children. This condition ensures the resilience of traits that parents do not actively transmit.
Still, existing theory fails to account for two important aspects of cultural transmission. First, it says little about how traits emerge. If societal role models of a new cultural trait do not exist then it is unclear how that culture would arise in a society where all parents socialize their children to the same preferred culture. Second, the theory does not inform us about how and why parents with the same cultural trait may prefer dierent traits for their children. Most eorts have focused on developing a framework for contexts where parents' cultural attitudes are xed. Yet, history is alive with examples of newly born cultural traits (e.g. the culture of social networking) and traits that switched from being perceived as virtuous or socially acceptable to being perceived as bad or undesirable, and vice versa (e.g. preferences about smoking, polluting the environment, pre-marital sex, polygyny, divorce, womens' rights etc.). Using the smoking habit as a case-study, we adapt the cultural transmission framework to account for this general class of traits.
Smoking of tobacco was rst adopted before the 15th century by native Americans, who used it for recreation, medicinal purposes, or as a hallucinogenic in rituals. When Christopher Columbus and his crew discovered the American continent, they also discovered smoking of tobacco and introduced the practice to Europe. In 1854, Philip Morris made the rst hand-rolled cigarettes in London's Bond Street. The second industrial revolution then saw the invention of the cigarette rolling machine, which made it possible to mass produce cigarettes cheaply. From that time and till the 1960s, the habit of smoking diused rapidly, producing high prots for the tobacco industry.
By the time of the world wars, smoking had become so socially acceptable that governments in most countries distributed cigarettes to troops as part of their regular daily rations. Some even continued to subsidize cigarette consumption during peacetime. The social perception of smoking started to change only after the publication of the Royal College of Physicians 1962 report on Smoking and Health (RCPL, 1962 ) and the US Surgeon General's Report on Smoking (USDHEW 1964). Those reports compiled and distilled for public consumption scientic evidence about the health consequences of tobacco use that had been accumulating for more than three decades.
In the ensuing years, public campaigns against tobacco consumption followed. Over time, those campaigns and the ever accumulating evidence impacted the popularity of the smoking habit.
What this brief history of smoking teaches us is that the dynamics of the smoking culture have been shaped by the strategic behavior of a prot-maximizing industry, and the discovery and diusion of scientic evidence.
We take this lesson to theory and build the rst model of cultural transmission that is able to predict both the emergence and the long-term persistence of culture in a world where outside forces may aect parents' preferred trait for their children. In our model, the exibility in parental preferences is due to the availability and spread of information aecting perceptions about the health cost of smoking. This makes our setup more general than existing models, each of which assumes a particular distribution of parental preferences, e.g. that all parents promote their own trait (Bisin and Verdier 2001) or that all parents promote the same trait (Saez-Marti and Sjogren 2008). We also relax a standard assumption in the literature that children are more likely to acquire a given trait the more popular that trait is in society. Instead, we assume the existence of a tobacco industry which can manipulate youth smoking behavior (e.g. via advertising). We respectively dene as cultural conformity and cultural distinction the positive and the negative relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of that trait in society. Our theory formalizes the relationship of parental and social inuences that existing models predict by showing that cultural substitution in the parental channel of transmission is always tied to cultural conformity in the social channel of transmission. It also makes the novel prediction that cultural distinction is always tied to cultural complementarity. To establish support for our predictions, we carry out an empirical investigation of smoking behavior using U.S. data.
Our empirical exercise adds to a small but growing group of`structural socialization studies' that explicitly test the properties of the transmission mechanism (e. . Consistent with our theoretical set-up, we model smoking participation by children as a function of parental socialization eorts and societal inuences. We then estimate this function using a novel dataset. Specically, we use data on the smoking behavior of parents and children, and on parental eorts to socialize children against substance use, from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics. We combine these data with newly constructed smoking prevalence rates from the Current Population Survey, and newly collected data on individual exposure to anti-smoking information based on the content of magazine articles. Our identication of the causal eect of parental socialization relies on state-and time-variation in parental exposure to anti-smoking information. Our identication of the causal eect of the societal inuences relies on the state-level measurement of the smoking prevalence, which rules out bias due to peer-choice and residential selection, and on the use of xed eects, which account for unobserved factors that drive both individual and group behavior. We nd evidence that supports our variant of the cultural transmission theory. Using our results, we project smoking participation rates of children to future generations and show that they converge to a steady-state in which smoking persists.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we summarize the health economics literature on smoking behavior and explain how this falls short of describing smoking dynamics across generations. In Section 3 we formally present our model. In Sections 4-6, we describe our empirical strategy, the data we use, and our empirical results. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. behavior of their parents' birth cohort in the UK when that cohort was at the same point in their life-cycle. The implication is that immigrant parents who grew up in a culture that tolerated (or even condoned) smoking will carry and transmit those values (consciously or subconsciously) to their children, thereby increasing the probability that they smoke.
The available theory on the economics of smoking does not reect the intuitive processes that the empirical evidence describes. To analyze smoking behavior, researchers typically use either a myopic addiction model or a rational addiction model. These models aim to explain the life-course dynamics of the consumption of addictive goods assuming that individuals introspectively change their own preferences. The former model assumes that current consumption depends on one's own past consumption (Pollak 1970 (Pollak , 1976a ); the latter model assumes that current consumption depends both on its past levels and on expectations of future consumption (Stigler and Becker 1977; Becker and Murphy 1988) . Both models ignore the possibility that one's consumption may depend on the (past, present, or future) consumption of another person. As importantly, both models stipulate that the initial consumption of the addictive good (i.e. when previous consumption has been consistently zero) depends only on current factors and characteristics (e.g. prices). Thus, neither model is able to account for the fact that two individuals with similar characteristics who face exactly the same environment may take dierent smoking initiation decisions depending on their familial experiences during childhood. In eect, the models fail to achieve their purpose of describing consumption dynamics over the life-course, and they completely ignore consumption dynamics across generations. The same holds for subsequent models that were built to reconcile the myopic and rational addiction theories (e.g. Zervos 1995, 1998 ).
The economic theory on social interactions, which was developing concurrently with the theory of addiction, oers a less restrictive framework of analysis. The benchmark study by Pollak (1976b) developed a model of habit formation and learning, allowing individual preferences to depend on others' behavior, which either provides information about the costs and benets of behavior, or establishes a point of reference. However, rarely have the theoretical implications of this approach been drawn with respect to smoking behavior, and in the few occasions that they have, they have focused on peer eects and have ignored the parental channel of transmission (e.g. Nakajima 2007, Poutvaara and Siemers 2008) . In this paper, we draw on the literature of intergenerational transmission of cultural traits to extend the theoretical analysis in this direction.
3
The model
Environment
Assume that there are an innite number of periods (t = 1, 2, 3, ...), and each individual is alive for two consecutive periods. A person born in period t is a child in period t and an adult in period t + 1. Each individual bears one child in adulthood. Hence, in period t + 1 the population consists of two overlapping generations: adults (born in period t) and children (born in period t + 1). We use he to refer to a generic child and she to refer to a generic adult.
Individuals are either smokers or non-smokers; we call q t the proportion of the youth who smoke in period t.
We then denote Q t+1 the proportion of adult smokers in period t + 1. An individual's smoking behavior need not be constant throughout the course of a lifetime, since a smoker may decide to quit smoking. To simplify the exposition, we however impose Q t+1 = q t . This is consistent with the literature on cultural transmission, which assumes a cultural trait is acquired once and for all during childhood.
1 Our results are qualitatively robust to extending the model to one where parents may quit smoking in adulthood.
Socialization process
Children are born without predened traits and acquire their smoking behavior through a transmission process.
A child is rst exposed to his parent's inuence, a process we refer to as vertical transmission. The parent's preferred trait need not coincide with her exhibited trait, and so our specication does not force parents to socialize their children to their own traits. In particular, a smoker parent may choose to socialize her child away 1 By implicitly assuming that socialization is a function of a parent's youth (rather than adult) smoking behavior, we are imposing that attitudes towards smoking are acquired early on in life. This modeling assumption allows us to abstract away from the strategic considerations that would arise from a situation where it would be Pareto optimal for all parents to quit smoking for their childrens' sake, but who cannot credibly commit to doing so because they each have an incentive to freeride on others' eorts.
from smoking, while remaining a smoker herself. The driving force for this divergence between own behavior and desired behavior could be, for instance, that quitting has addiction costs that are only incurred by someone who already smokes. To our knowledge, Saez-Marti and Sjogren (2008) and Patacchini and Zenou (2011) are the only studies to have theoretically investigated in a cultural transmission framework the possibility that parents agree on the trait to be passed on to future generations (e.g. educational attainment). In contrast, the bulk of the literature on cultural transmission has been motivated by the study of traits like religion, where parents want to promote their own trait.
Bisin and Verdier call`direct' transmission the process of having parents socialize children to their own traits.
Vertical transmission' can thus be thought of as a generalization of`direct transmission'.
2 We will then refer to a parent socializing her child to her own trait as direct socialization, and to a parent socializing her child to a trait other than her own as active socialization. From here on, we focus on the case where all parents want to discourage their children from becoming smokers. A smoker parent does not directly socialize her child to smoke, nor does a non-smoker parent actively socialize her child to smoke. This feature arises endogenously once we let parents choose the extent of vertical transmission, as it would be counterproductive to ever encourage children to acquire the unwanted cultural trait. In the terminology of the model, non-smoker parents directly socialize their children to their own trait with probability d (q t ), while smoker-parents actively socialize their children to the other trait with probability a (q t ). With remaining probability 1 − d (q t ) for non-smoker parents, and 1 − a (q t ) for smoker parents, the child acquires his trait through non parental inuences, a channel which the literature typically labels as horizontal transmission. With probability S (q t ) / 1 − S (q t ), the child then becomes a smoker/non-smoker.
We think of S (q t ) as reecting not only the inuence of societal role models but also the advertising eorts of a prot-maximizing tobacco industry, as well as the child's own choices.
Throughout the analysis, we impose one of two possible assumptions on the vertical transmission process:
cultural substitution or cultural complementarity. Assumption V1 (Cultural Substitution): d (q t ) and a (q t ) are increasing in q t , and
Assumption V2 (Cultural Complementarity): d (q t ) and a (q t ) are decreasing in q t , and d (1) = a (1) = 0.
Assumption V1 says that a parent's vertical transmission eort is an increasing function of the unwanted trait in society, and that parents exert no eort when the unwanted trait is absent from society. When smoking is the unwanted trait, parents want to make sure their children do not fall prey to the inuence of smoker role models, and so d (q t ) and a (q t ) are increasing functions of smoking prevalence q t . Assumption V2 says that a 2 Note however that our terminology deviates from the literature, which interchangeably uses vertical and direct transmission to refer to children mimicking their parents.
parent's vertical transmission eort is a decreasing function of smoking prevalence in society. This phenomenon can emanate in two possible ways. Parents may either give up on socializing their children when the outside threat becomes greater, or the threat of the unwanted trait might be decreasing with its prevalence in society.
We also impose one of two assumption on the horizontal transmission process: cultural conformity or cultural distinction. While cultural conformity has been an implicit feature of existing models on cultural transmission, cultural distinction has been largely overlooked by theoretical studies. In a recent paper, Bisin et al. (2013) call cultural conformity (distinction) the drop (increase) in psychological costs of interacting with a member of an outside cultural group when that outside group becomes more dominant. They use those notions to understand the implications of ethnic identify on marriage outcomes in a cultural transmission framework. We, however, dene those concepts dierently:
A large literature on identity formation in psychology, sociology, and political science argues that cultural or ethnic minority groups may either pursue cultural assimilation into the majority population or they may strive to keep their distinct identities. 3 We follow this reasoning to assume that the child culturally distinguishes himself when he horizontally adopts the minority culture, and he culturally conforms when he horizontally adopts the majority culture. Thus, cultural distinction predicts that the greater smoking prevalence is in society, the less likely the child is to adopt this trait. Cultural conformity makes the opposite prediction, that the greater smoking prevalence is in society, the more likely the child is to adopt this trait.
As we noted above, our denition of cultural conformity has been implicitly assumed in the literature as part of the horizontal socialization. Existing work has thought of S (q t ) as representing a matching process, i.e. the This matching process must satisfy two basic properties: (i) A child can only be matched to a non-smoker/smoker when there are only non-smokers/smokers (S (0) = 0 and S (1) = 1), and (ii) the likelihood of being matched to a smoker increases with the proportion of smokers in society (i.e. our denition of cultural conformity). As we will show in the empirical section of this paper, there is strong support for the possibility of having cultural distinction, which cannot be accommodated by existing models. More importantly, the study of dynamics in Section 3.5 reveals that under cultural substitution, assuming S (0) = 0 leads to the disappearing of the smoking culture in steady state, which is at odds with real-world behavior. The mechanism for horizontal transmission that we propose addresses this gap in the theoretical literature. 
Endogenous vertical transmission
We now explicitly dene the likelihood that a child follows his parent's desire to not smoke as a function of parental socialization. We nd the optimal level of parental investment, and derive comparative statics for the eect of smoking prevalence and health costs of smoking.
As before, the subscript i ∈ {0, 1} denotes the adult's smoking behavior. When the child is born, his parent decides how much to invest in his anti-smoking socialization, λ i ≥ 0. The cost of socialization is c (λ i ), and causes the child to become a non-smoker with probability v (λ i ). With remaining probability 1 − v (λ i ), the child becomes a smoker with probability S (q), and a non-smoker with probability 1 − S (q).
We normalize a parent's utility from not seeing her child smoke to 0. We then denote by u i (H) < 0 the utility of having a child who smokes, where H represents the perceived (but not necessarily actual, H) detrimental health eects of smoking. All parents alike value their children's health status, and so u i (H) decreases with the perceived health costs of smoking. Formally, an adult's utility function can be written as follows:
where a parent's investment is associated with a probability (1 − v (λ i )) S (q) of seeing her child smoke. Proposition 1 gives the optimal interior investment in the anti-smoking acculturation of a child.
Proposition 1: Let v (.) be a dierentiable, increasing and concave function, and c (.) be a dierentiable, increasing and convex function. When interior, a parent's optimal investment choice λ * i solves
The assumptions on v (.) and c (.) are standard to ensure the existence of a unique solution to the maximization problem. They state that (i) more eort leads to a greater likelihood (cost) of dissuading the child from acquiring the unwanted behavior, and (ii) the eectiveness (cost) of this investment decreases (increases) in the amount of eort that is invested. The optimal investment choice simply equates the marginal cost of investing to its expected marginal benet. The assumption that u i (H) < 0 for i = 0, 1 makes it not optimal for any parent to invest in pro-smoking culturalization, as this would promote the parent's undesired trait. Had we assumed instead that smoker parents perceive a non-negative net utility from smoking, u 1 (H) ≥ 0 , we would be in the world of Bisin Proposition 2: Performing comparing statics on the optimal investment derived in Proposition 1, we obtain the following predictions:
• Prediction 1: Parents who perceive larger health costs from smoking invest more in anti-smoking culturalization.
• Prediction 2: We have cultural substitution i cultural conformity holds, and cultural complementarity i cultural distinction holds.
Prediction 1 is straightforward; it states that parents invest more in the anti-smoking culturalization of their children the more serious the health costs of this habit. Prediction 2 says that vertical socialization follows cultural substitution when horizontal socialization follows cultural conformity, which is a well-known theoretical result in the literature, starting with Bisin and Verdier (2001) . It implies that when a higher smoking prevalence increases the likelihood that a child smokes, it is more worthwhile for the parent to exert socialization eort. However, Prediction 2 also says that vertical socialization follows cultural complementarity when horizontal socialization follows cultural distinction, which is a result that is not emphasized in the literature. It implies that when smoking prevalence decreases the likelihood that a child smokes, it also lowers the value of socialization to the parent. Patacchini and Zenou (2011) produce the opposite nding in a cultural transmission model augmented with peer eects at the vertical transmission stage. Their result requires assuming that both the cost and marginal cost of socialization are increasing in the proportion of smokers. Like the rest of the literature, we instead favor a framework where society only plays a role through horizontal transmission; i.e. in the event that the parent is unsuccessful at socializing her child to the desired trait.
Endogenous horizontal transmission
To complete the model, we explicitly dene the likelihood that the child adopts smoking through non-parental channels. Before parents decide how much to socialize their children, a prot-maximizing monopolist chooses a level of investment θ into increasing the appeal of smoking to the youth. Such a feature could arise, for example, through celebrity endorsements of this habit. Advertising θ can be thought of as stimulating "demand", but to have diminishing marginal returns, so that ∂S(q,θ) ∂θ > 0 and
The function κ (θ) represents the convex cost of advertising (κ > 0 and κ > 0). Keeping the rm's investment constant, we assume that S (.) can still be thought of as a matching process, so that ∂S(q,θ) ∂q > 0. We nally impose a regulatory condition to ensure an interior level of investment for the rm, ∂S(0,θ) ∂θ > κ (0). Proposition 3 describes the equilibrium of the game implied between the monopolist and parents.
5 We put this word in quotation marks given that children do not make any active choice in the cultural transmission framework.
Proposition 3: In a subgame perfect equilibrium, we have S (0, θ * (0)) > 0, which ensures a heterogeneous distribution of traits in steady state. Moreover, both cultural substitution and cultural conformity may obtain. The main take away message is that both cultural conformity and cultural distinction are realistic possibilities. We leave it to the data to tell us when each obtains.
Dynamics
We summarize the period t + 1 transmission process into a transition matrix
gives the proportion of children of non-smokers (smokers) who adopt smoking. This matrix is subscripted by the time period t since transmission is a function of the parents' smoking behavior, which is acquired in their youth. We can represent the evolution of smoking in society through the
where the superscript T indicates the transpose of a matrix. The following result describes the steady state behavior of the system.
Proposition 4: In a steady state, there always exists a fraction of non-smokers. Moreover, under cultural complementarity the smoking habit always persists, while under cultural substitution it persists as long as S (0) > 0.
Under cultural complementarity, we must have cultural distinction (Proposition 2), and therefore children always have the proclivity to reject the status-quo so that neither traits disappear in steady state. Under cultural substitution, smoking never becomes the unique trait since parents have an incentive to prevent this from happening. In contrast, smoking may disappear if no outside factor forces it to persist. Given Proposition 3, we know that the existence of a tobacco industry can guarantee the coexistence of both traits under this scenario.
Empirical strategy
We use the following baseline specication: P r(ever smoke = 1) c = α 0 + α 1 * P r(socialization = 1) p + α 2 * sm. prevalence of role model population cs
+ β 1 * exposure to health inf ormation p + β 2 * sm. prevalence of role model population cs
Equation (3) is the empirical counterpart of P T , as described in the previous section. It is a structural form equation that treats P r(socialization = 1) as the endogenous regressor. Equation (4) is the empirical counterpart of (1). In this rst-stage equation we identify parental socialization using dierent indicators of the parent's exposure to health information as instruments. X denotes exogenous control variables; α denotes a structural parameter; and β denotes a reduced-form parameter. Indexes c and p stand for child and parent, respectively; s stands for state; and j identies each characteristic (individual, parental, or state) that we include as a control variable. Finally, ν and υ are the jointly distributed error terms.
We estimate (3) and (4) as a system by IV probit, even though this method is meant to be used when the endogenous regressor is continuous rather than binary. Because Heckman's (1978) maximum likelihood bivariate probit was built to accommodate binary endogenous regressors, it would have been more appropriate to use in our case. However, we choose not to use it because it is computationally cumbersome, 6 and it does not signicantly outperform IV probit or even IV linear probability models in terms of accuracy (see Nichols 2011 and references therein). To conrm the latter point, we test the robustness of our baseline specication to a range of alternative estimation methods, including the bivariate probit.
To statistically identify exogenous variation in parental socialization we assume that, controlling for the child's own exposure to anti-smoking articles, we can exclude parental exposure to health information as a direct determinant of the child's decision to smoke. To test this exclusion restriction, we calculate the Amemiya-Lee-Newey 6 Researchers nd that to run a bivariate probit often takes 10 or 20 times as long as other similar models, and that standard statistical software like Stata and R frequently fail to nd the maximum of the likelihood (e.g. Freedman and Sekhon 2010) (ALN) minimum χ 2 statistic under the null that the instruments are valid (i.e. uncorrelated with the error term) and correctly excluded from the outcome equation.
7 To test whether our instruments have weak explanatory power, we calculate the χ 2 statistic under the null that the instruments are jointly statistically insignicant in the reduced form. We also calculate the Hausman χ 2 statistic to test whether there is a statistically signicant dierence between IV probit and probit (naive) estimates. The null of this test is that the probit model provides both consistent and ecient estimates while IV probit estimates are only consistent, and that the dierence between the two is normally distributed with mean zero. Further, we calculate the Wald χ 2 statistic to test the null that the correlation coecient between ν and υ is zero and, therefore, P r(socialization = 1) can be treated as exogenous. Finally, we check the robustness of our baseline estimates to the inclusion of a wide range of controls and instruments.
To statistically identify the social transmission of the smoking trait we rely on the fact that the smoking prevalence of the role-model population is measured at the state-level. Because we can plausibly assume that state-specic smoking prevalence is exogenous to the parental choice of the state of residence and it cannot be aected by endogenous peer-choice, we rule out selection and simultaneity bias from the estimated eects. Bias due to exogenous correlated eects, however, remains a possibility (Manski 1993 (Manski , 2000 . The smoking prevalence of the role-model population is the aggregation of individual behavior which (depending on how the role-model population is dened) may include the parent or the child. Thus, our estimate of α 2 may reect the fact that individuals in a given state have similar smoking behavior because they have unobserved similar characteristics or because they are exposed to the same institutional or contextual factors (`Manski's reection problem'). To account for such unobserved common factors, we follow the health economics literature and use a xed eects specication (see, for example, Nakajima 2007 and references therein). Because, as we describe below, the smoking prevalence of the role model population varies by state and child age, we include a full set of state and age xed-eects. We thus identify causality of the social eects by using variations in the proportion of smokers between age-groups within a state.
We use the results to assess whether socialization by parents and role models aect a child's smoking decision, to identify the relative contribution of the two types of socialization to the transmission of the smoking culture, and to test important properties of the transmission process; namely, cultural substitution versus complementarity, and cultural conformity versus cultural distinction. Finally, we use the structural parameter estimates to forward project how the rate of ever-smoking of 10-18 year olds will evolve under dierent policy scenaria.
7 The Amemiya-Lee-Newey test is only possible after running the two-step Newey (1985) IV probit estimator. All other results we present in this paper are derived using the maximum likelihood IVprobit estimator.
Data
Our empirical analysis exploits new as well as existing data in novel ways. Below we discuss the source and construction of each type of data. Table 1 provides summary statistics of selected variables.
5.1
Individual level data on children and care-givers and drug use. We use the data on whether a child ever smoked (dened on the survey as smoking at least 1 cigarette every day for 30 days) to represent P r(ever smoke = 1) c . Eighteen percent of our sample smoked at some time between age 10 and 18.
The CDS-TA surveys asks questions not only of the child but also of the person in the PSID household who identied herself/himself as the`primary' care-giver (PCG) of that child. Table 1 documents that biological mothers comprise 93 percent of self-identied care-givers, six percent of care-givers are biological fathers, and the rest are adoptive mothers or step-mothers. Because of the disproportionate share of biological mothers in our sample, we cannot separately model how cultural transmission varies with the nature of the parent-child relationship.
While the CDS-TA surveys do not ask questions that are specically about smoking socialization eorts of the PCG, the surveys do collect information that is likely to proxy for it. Ideally the surveys would ask each PCG to report how much eort she spends socializing her child about the health risks of smoking. Instead the CDS/TA surveys asked each care-giver to report how frequently during the past month she talked to each child about the dangers of substance use (e.g. drinking alcohol or taking drugs). The survey specied ve response categories that ranged from not in the past month to every day. While these data are not ideal, we expect answers to them to be correlated with the conceptual variable of interest. In addition, we identify variation in the pattern of responses in these data using variation in information that is specically about health risks of smoking. As a result, though imperfect, the CDS data are likely to proxy well for the conceptual variable of interest. Table 1 shows that 21 percent of care-givers reported they had not spoken with their child about the dangers of substance use in the past month. Most (42 percent) care-givers discussed this subject once or twice per month. However, 37
percent of care-givers discussed substance use at least once a week during the previous month.
In addition to the socialization data, we draw CDS-TA data on age, sex, race, and religion of the child; household income; family size; and measures of parenting styles, reading habits, and employment status of the PCG.
We also draw data on the smoking behavior and educational attainment of the PCGs from the main PSID After dropping multiple observations for each individual across monthly waves of the same calendar year, we pool all data from these waves and use the smoking questions to construct the smoking history of every TUS-CPS respondent. To do this we identify all respondents who ever smoked and who report a start age, a current smoking status, and a quit age (former smokers only). We then assume that a person smoked in every year between the age she started and either the age at the survey date (current smokers) or the age she quit (former smokers).
Because in each calendar year our sample includes all respondents who were alive in that year and retrospectively answered the smoking questions in any later year, we start with an enormous sample of current, ever, and never smokers (approximately 81 million observations). We combine our computed smoking life-histories with data on the state of residence (at the time of the survey) to construct smoking prevalence rates by sex, cohort, state, and calendar year (weighted by the CPS sampling weights).
To match our empirical specication as closely as possible with our theory, we assume that a child's role model is drawn from his parent's generation. This assumption means that we create smoking prevalence rates of the role model population using males and females who are 20-29 years older than the child.
8 Table 1 shows that among the potential social role models of children in our sample, the average smoking prevalence rate is 26 percent. Later in the analysis we experiment with dierent denitions of the role-model population (by age and sex).
To illustrate the variation in the data we develop, Figure 1 plots the smoking rates by sex, state, and calendar year for the social role models of children who are age 14 at the time of the survey (i.e. at mean age). While these data have rich variation across all dimensions, the variation we can exploit is limited because we only observe a child's smoking behavior and his parent's socialization eort in 2002 and 2007. Despite that limitation, plenty of variation remains available to us: across states, gender, and by child age. Figure 2 showcases the data that we actually use in the analysis.
9 Clearly, the smoking rates vary signicantly by gender and state, but note that, because the state-specic curves cross, the rates also vary by age of the child/parent generation.
Information about the health risks of smoking
To instrument parental socialization we use temporal and geographic variation in exposure to information about the health risks of smoking. The basic data consist of counts of articles published between 1924 and 2009 that warn readers about the health risks of smoking. We use counts of articles published in each of more than 21 popular consumer magazines. To generate additional geographical, but also temporal variation, we also exploit data on the number of issues of each magazine that were sold in each state in each year.
The data on articles were generated by rst searching two electronic databases (ProQuest and the Historical
Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature) using a keyword search on smok* and cancer, smok* and health, Consequently, smoking prevalence rates in January are lower and more widely distributed than smoking prevalence rates over the whole year.
and resolved. The resulting list of articles generated a list of magazines in which the articles appeared.
We then compiled data on sales of each of those magazines in every state in each year. We got the sales data from the Audit Bureau of Circulation. The Audit Bureau of Circulation is an organization that publishers voluntarily join. Its sole purpose is to audit and verify circulation gures the publishers provide to them. Their independent auditing provides a valuable service to publishers because they charge advertisers more for space in more widely circulated magazines. Advertisers therefore demand (and publishers willingly provide) an independently veried count of circulation. The magazine circulation data vary by month, year, and state.
We assume that, when a magazine is sold, it is seen by all members of the household in which the purchaser resides.
10 To capture this exposure, we divide estimates of each state's population from the Current Population
Reports of the Census Bureau by 2.3 (the average household size) and divide the number of issues sold in each state in each year by that number. The resulting gure is an estimate of the fraction of each state's population that read each magazine (in each year). We then multiply the fraction of each state's population that read each magazine by the number of articles that appeared in that magazine. This step yields the exposure of a randomly drawn person from a given state to an article that appeared in a given magazine in a given year. Finally, we sum across all magazines in which an anti-smoking article appeared. The nal data proxy for the total potential exposure to anti-smoking magazine articles in a given state in a given year. Currently we compute this sum using articles that appear in 21 magazines that accounted for 70 percent of all anti-smoking magazine articles produced by the above searches. Formally our measure is given by:
Anti-smoking articles read st =
m=1
Articles mt Issues mst
where s denotes state, t denotes calendar year, and m denotes each of 21 magazines. shown to predict changes in consumption of fats and oils as information developed and spread about the health risks of consumption of saturated, monounsaturated, and poly unsaturated fats (Chern et al. 1995) . We start counting exposure from age 10, assuming that it is the earliest age a child can comfortably read. Year 1929 is the earliest year in which a PCG in our sample was age 10, and year 1994 is the earliest year in which a child was age 10. Thus, our measures of exposure for PCGs (i.e. our instruments) encompasses all temporal and state variation illustrated in Figure 3 . In contrast, our equivalent measure for children (which we use as a control) encompasses 10 In fact we only assume a household member potentially sees the article. From now on we use the terms exposure and potential exposure interchangeably.
the variation illustrated in the shaded area only. The`typical' PCG in our sample has been exposed to about 12 anti-smoking articles since age 10, while the corresponding number for the`typical' child is 4.
Indicators of the economic environment
In our regressions, we control for time-varying state-specic economic factors that may aect the child's probability to smoke or the PCG's socialization eorts. Specically, we control for state and federal cigarette taxes and state per-capita income. We use the measure of`full' taxes on cigarettes described in Lillard and Sfekas (2013 6 Results
Vertical versus horizontal transmission of the smoking trait
The naive way to think about the cultural transmission of the smoking trait would be to assume no reverse causality between parental socialization eorts and the childrens' decision to smoke. Table 2 presents estimates of equation (3) under this assumption; that is, by treating P r(socialization = 1) as exogenous. In column 1 we use the socialization data in their`raw' form; i.e. in ve categorical dummy variables: not in the past month (the reference category), once/twice a month, once a week, several times a week, and daily. In columns 2-5 we dichotomize the data into a single dummy to denote that children are socialized with`at least' a given level of frequency (at least once/twice per month, at least once a week etc.). The resulting estimates vary across the combinations. In column 1, PCG socialization eorts are associated with a higher probability that the child ever smokes, even though that association decreases as the frequency of socialization increases. The estimates in column 2 also suggest a positive association, while columns 3-5 suggest a weak negative association (which in 3 and 5 is statistically insignicant). The probable cause of these counterintuitive results is the endogeneity of the socialization variable. Children may be less likely to smoke when their parents socialize them against it, but it is also likely that a PCG will discuss substance use more often if a child smokes or the parent suspects a child is likely to smoke. To isolate the former eect we abandon the naive approach. Table 3 presents our baseline estimates of jointly determined equations (3) and (4), as described in Section 4.
11 To simplify the analysis, we dichotomize the socialization variable, P r(socialization = 1), to indicate the probability that the PCG socializes the child about the dangers of substance use at least once a week.
12 As we mentioned earlier, we instrument the PCG's socialization eorts with the parental exposure to smoking-related health information since age 10 and the infrequency of that exposure. In contrast to the results in column 3 of Table   2 , the coecient on the instrumented socialization variable is negative and statistically signicant, suggesting that a parent's eort to socialize her child is eective. The performance of the instruments in the rst-stage equation is satisfactory: they are statistically signicant and the sign of their coecients are in the direction described in Prediction 1. Those PCGs who are exposed to more anti-smoking articles on average also exert more eort to socialize their children. Holding the average level of exposure constant, PCGs socialize their children less if their exposure varies more over time. That is, PCGs socialize their children more when they are exposed to a constant stream of information about the health risks of smoking compared to PCGs who see the same number of articles on average but who see no articles in some years and many articles in others. The diagnostic test results corroborate the good performance of our instruments and of the baseline specication in general.
We should note that a factor contributing to instrument validity is that the baseline specication controls for the child's exposure to anti-smoking articles since age 10. Again, the estimated coecient on this variable makes economic sense: a higher information exposure of the child is associated with a lower probability that the child ever smokes and with a lower socialization eort by the PCG (as s/he now relies on the external information to do the job). Although the statistical signicance of these eects is somewhat weak, it is important to mention that removing the measure of child exposure from the estimation signicantly impacts the ALN test of overidentication. In this case, the χ 2 statistic increases to 3.255 and the probability values drops to 0.071, so that we reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid at the 10% level of signicance.
In all regressions reported in Tables 2 and 3 , the probability that the child ever smokes increases with the state-specic smoking prevalence rates of the role-model population, providing evidence for cultural conformity.
In the rst-stage of Table 3 , the socialization eort of PCGs also increases with the smoking prevalence in the role model population and it is statistically unrelated to parental smoking status, providing evidence for cultural substitution. The co-existence of cultural substitution and conformity supports Prediction 2 of the model. It suggests that all parents wish to discourage smoking and, because they know that their children will conform to societal trends, they will increase their anti-smoking socialization eorts when smoking becomes more popular in society (we expand this discussion in Section 6.3).
11 From this point onwards all regressions are estimated by IV probit. See Table 4 in the Appendix for a set of robustness test of the baseline estimates to alternative methods of estimation.
12 We dichotomize the socialization variable because the coecients on the dierent versions of the socialization variable presented in columns 2-5 of Table 2 suggest that socialization categories once a week, several times per week and every day produce results that are similar among them but much dierent to the results produced by category once/twice a month. This implies that the response distribution we observe could be a mixture of two distributions, each capturing a dierent kind of decision process. Nonetheless, our baseline results show low sensitivity to the denition of the dichotomized socialization variable. See Table 5 for the robustness analysis. In a similar exercise, Patacchini and Zenou (2011) use the frequency that a parent reads to a child to capture parental eort to cultivate interest in education to the child. They dichotomize their socialization variable the same way.
To compare the importance of the parental (vertical) and social (horizontal) channels of transmission of the smoking habit, we calculate marginal eects of`equivalent' changes in parental socialization eorts and the smoking prevalence of the role model population on the probability that the child smokes. Clearly, dening changes of equivalent magnitude in two completely dierent variables is a challenge. We take a`let the data speak' approach and allow both variables to increase by half their standard deviation. This corresponds to a 9.8 percentage point increase in the share of parents who socialize their children at least once a week (from 41.6% to 51.4%)
13 , and to a 2.6 percentage point increase in the smoking prevalence rate of the role model population (from 26.3% to 28.9%).
We nd that these changes cause the likelihood that the child smokes to decrease by 3.9 percentage points and to increase by 2.8 percentage points, respectively. The implication is that parental inuences are stronger than social inuences in the determination of youth smoking participation. Note that we reach this conclusion without taking into account the direct eects of parental smoking behavior on the probability of youth smoking participation (e.g. due to genetics, mimicking, nicotine addiction from passive smoking, or easier access to cigarettes). Our results suggest that this channel of transmission is also important; the child is more likely to have ever smoked when the PCG has ever smoked. The reported marginal eects, therefore, understate the true eect of the parental channel of transmission. Tables 2 and 3 control for the PCG's education, family income, state cigarette tax, state income, and a wealth of demographic variables.
All regressions in
14 The signs of the estimated coecients on all these variables are in the expected direction and consistent with empirical ndings in the health economics literature. The child is more likely to have ever smoked when the PCG is less educated, when family and state income is low, and when cigarette taxes are low. The PCG is more likely to socialize the child at least once a week when s/he is highly educated, when family and state income is higher, and when cigarette taxes are higher (e.g. because, when taxes are high, smoking by the child entails a higher nancial cost for the entire family). From this point on, we do not show estimated coecients on the control variables, but rather focus on the variables of interest.
Robustness analysis
Although the baseline specication is already very conservative, there are reasons that induce us to test its robustness to new instruments and controls. First, the performance of our instruments may be impaired by their limited variation; e.g., our measure of PCG exposure to health information does not vary across PCGs who live in the same state and were born in the same year. We could benet from an exposure measure that is parentspecic and adds individual-level variation to our instrument. Second, our denition of the exposure measure (i.e.
13 Because the parental socialization variable is binary, we calculate its standard deviation (0.19) using its estimated value from the reduced-form regression. To induce an increase in this variable that corresponds to half of its standard deviation, we had to randomly shift PCGs from category 0 to category 1 so that the mean of the variable increases by 9.8 percentage points. This is mathematically equivalent to increasing the probability of socialization for those parents who do not socialize their kids at least once a week from 0 to 0.17 (=(0.19/2)/(1-0.416)).
14 To save space, we do not present coecients on the age xed eects of the PCG and the age, sex, state, race, and religion xed-eects of the child. However, full results for all models are available on request.
as the accumulated sum of anti-smoking articles) imposes the restrictive assumptions that information does not decay and that it has constant returns to scale. More exible specications of the exposure measure may be more appropriate. Third, in our baseline specication we do not account for dierences in the personality of children or in parenting styles. Both of these have been shown in the psychology literature to vary with children's smoking behavior and the eectiveness of parental socialization eorts (e.g. Huver et al. 2007 ). Fourth, in our baseline specication we do not control for dierences across PCGs in the cost of the parental socialization eorts. We next try to address these issues using a new set of variables which Table 6 presents along with some basic descriptive statistics.
Our rst exercise aims at introducing individual-level variation in our set of instruments. To do this, we draw from the PSID-CDS-TA a variable that measures how often the PCG reads the newspaper during the week. Assuming that this variable is highly correlated with magazine readership, we interact it with the PCG's information exposure measure to generate a new variable that varies across PCGs. Column 1 of Table 7 tests the robustness of the baseline specication to this inclusion. The results are highly robust, and the new instrument appears with a positive and signicant coecient, suggesting that anti-smoking information is more eective at increasing parental socialization eorts when parents have the habit of reading the newspaper often. In comparison to the baseline results, the diagnostic test results are slightly improved (e.g. the probability value of the the ALN test statistic increases to 0.578).
As a further robustness test, we dene information exposure to be the average number (instead of the accumulated sum) of anti-smoking articles that the PCG or the child potentially read since age 10. This specication essentially decreases the contributing value of each anti-smoking article by a factor proportional to the age of the PCG, so that (older) PCGs who see a given number of articles over a longer life-span end up with a lower information exposure score than (younger) PCGs who see the same number of articles over a shorter life-span.
In other words, the new exposure measure allows the value of information to decay over time. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 7 show how the baseline estimates change when we replace the original exposure measure with this new measure, and when we interact it with the frequency the PCG reads the newspaper. Although the results are qualitatively robust to this change and the instrument coecients are positive and statistically signicant, the tests of instrument identication reject the hypothesis that the instruments are valid.
Finally, in Table 8 we check the robustness of the baseline estimates to controls that capture personality traits of the child and parenting styles of the PCG (column 1), to controls that capture the cost of PCG socialization eorts (column 2), and to both set of controls together (column 3).
The rst set of controls includes: (i) an indicator of whether the child has a tendency to break rules, which we create by combining a selection of variables documenting problematic past behavior (see note of Table 6 for the exact denition); (ii) an indicator of high and strict parental control, which we create by combining responses of the PCG to questions about the number of rules s/he impose on the child, whether these rules are strictly enforced, and whether s/he discusses these rules with the child; (iii) an indicator of violent parenting, which ags whether the child is spanked more than 3 times per week; and (iv) an indicator of complete lack of communication among the PCG and the child. Controlling for these variables is potentially important because it may further address the problem of reverse causality between socialization eorts of the PCG and the smoking behavior of the child. Rebellious children or children subject to authoritative parenting may react against parental anti-smoking pressure and may be more likely to smoke when the socialization eorts of the PCG are more frequent. We nd that the these controls signicantly predict the dependent variables in both the structural and reduced-form equation, while leaving the remaining coecients almost unaected. As expected, children who are rule-breakers and children who are spanked regularly are more likely to ever smoke and more likely to be socialized by PCGs.
In contrast, children who are under strict parental control are less likely to ever smoke and are less often socialized by parents. Finally, children who never discuss any subject with their parents are more likely to ever smoke.
Our measures of the parental socialization cost include: (i) the number of individuals younger than 18 in the family unit; (ii) an indicator of whether the PCG is employed; (iii) the weekly hours that the PCG spends at work;
(iv) an indicator of whether the PCG works a regular daytime schedule; and (v) an indicator of whether it takes the PCG over an hour to get to work each way. Once more, we nd that, when included in the baseline regression, these variables signicantly predict the dependent variables and only result in small quantitative changes in the estimated coecients of the other variables. Children who live in households with many other children are less likely to smoke and more likely to be socialized by PCGs. Children of working parents are less likely to smoke but also less likely to be socialized, whereas children whose parents work more and regular hours are more likely to smoke and more likely to be socialized.
When we insert in the baseline specication all the new controls together we obtain similar results. All three specications of Table 8 pass the diagnostic tests. In fact, the probability values of the ALM test for specications
(1) and (3) are higher in comparison to that of the baseline specication (0.860 and 0.648, respectively), suggesting that the addition of the controls aids identication.
The mechanisms underlying the transmission process
In the previous sections we found a positive coecient on the smoking prevalence of the role-model population in both the reduced-form and the structural-form equations. We interpreted these ndings as evidence for cultural substitution and conformity. In this section, we scrutinize these results by carrying out two exercises. First, we interact parental smoking status with the prevalence rate of the role-model population to inform our discussion of cultural substitution. Second, we use alternative denitions of the role-model population to inform our discussion on cultural conformity. Both exercises allow us to conrm the links between substitution and conformity and between complementarity and distinction. We conclude this section by further exploring dierences in the socialization process between smoker and non-smoker parents.
Substitution versus complementarity
Assuming that both smoker and non-smoker parents wish to discourage smoking, cultural substitution entails that all parents should increase anti-smoking socialization eorts in response to the smoking rate in society. The rst-stage estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 show that this prediction is supported by the data. We nd positive and signicant coecients on all interactions of smoking prevalence and parental smoking status. We read this result to suggest that our extension of the Bisin and Verdier model is more appropriate to use when studying the transmission of traits like smoking than the Bisin and Verdier model in its original version. If smoker parents wished to transmit the smoking culture to their children, like the Bisin and Verdier model would assume, then we would expect to nd evidence of cultural complementarity for smoker parents and cultural substitution for non-smoker parents (i.e. positive coecients on the interaction terms in Table 9 for non-smoker parents, and negative coecients for smoker parents). However, our results suggest otherwise.
As our model predicts, we nd similar behavior across smokers and non-smoker parents because there is an exogenous force (anti-smoking information) that has changed people's perceptions of smoking from a`good' trait to a`bad' trait. As a result, parents wish to socialize children to be non-smokers, even if they themselves smoke.
We follow this logic to develop another implication: we should nd evidence of culture complementarity among smoker PCGs exposed to little (or very low) anti-smoking information because, absent other information, these would still consider smoking to be a good trait. In column 3 of Table 9 we attempt to test this hypothesis by interacting the parental smoking status with smoking prevalence in the role model population at dierent quantiles of parental information exposure (quantiles 0-10, 10-50, 50-90, and 90-100).
We note that, in our data there is no PCG who is subject to no anti-smoking information. All PCGs are exposed to some non-negligible level of information. In fact, the PCG at the 10th percentile of the distribution of our exposure variable saw 8 articles, relative to a mean of 12. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that we do not nd evidence of cultural complementarity in our results (none of the estimated coecients carries a negative sign). Nonetheless, there is enough variation in the data to reveal two important patterns that corroborate our theoretical set-up. First, when the smoking prevalence of the role model population increases, all parents respond by increasing their socialization eorts, and their response is larger the more exposed they are to information about the health risks of smoking. Second, this response is not statistically dierent from zero for smoker parents who are exposed to very low levels of information. These ndings encourage us to speculate that, had we observed in our data parents with no or negligible information exposure, we would be able to document a switch in the direction of the relationship between parental socialization and the proportion of smokers in society from positive to negative.
Conformity versus distinction
To this point, all the results we have reported are based on the assumption that children derive their role-models from the population that is 20-29 years older. Next, we test whether the probability that the child ever smokes is associated with the smoking prevalence rate of the population of individuals 0-9 and 10-19 years older than the child, and whether that association diers by gender.
15 We present our results in Table 10 . Estimates in columns 1-4 are based on the total sample, while estimates in columns 5 and 6 are based on data on male and female children, respectively.
The structural form estimates suggest that the probability that the child ever smokes increases with the smoking prevalence rates of all population sub-groups, except for males who are 0-9 years older. The implication is that, in relation to the bulk of the population, children form their smoking decisions based on their needs to achieve assimilation, inclusiveness, and cultural conformity. In relation to the sub-group of young boys, however, the childrens' motive is the exact opposite. In this case, it is their need to generate a sense of distinctiveness from individuals that are part of that group that motivates their smoking decisions. To put it bluntly, our results suggest that young boys operate as anti-role-models. Although this result might seem surprising, one should note that health economic studies on peer eects have not reached a consensus on gender dierences in social inuence.
For example, Nakajima (2007) study peer eects of smoking among school-mates in the US and nds that these are positive and signicant within the same gender but statistically negligible across genders. In contrast, Clark and Loheac (2007) study peer eects on dierent types of risky behavior among friends and school-mates in the US and nd signicant cross-gender interactions for alcohol use, with young males being more inuential than young girls. While we are the rst to provide evidence on cultural distinction using smoking data, our evidence complements those presented in the study of ethnic identity formation by Bisin et al.(2013) . These authors nd that, in neighborhoods in which the share of a given ethnic group is high, the association between the share of the ethnic group and individual ethnic identities is negative.
The link between substitution (complementarity) and conformity (distinction)
In both Tables 9 and 10 , the smoking prevalence rates signicantly predict the PCGs socialization eorts in the reduced form and the probability that the child smokes in the structural form. Importantly, these eects always run in the same direction, a result which reconrms the inter-connection between cultural substitution and conformity and between cultural complementarity and distinction, and corroborates Prediction 2 of the model. This result suggests that, because all parents wish to discourage smoking, they will increase their anti-smoking socialization eorts when smoking becomes more popular among all societal groups to which their children will conform, and they decrease their anti-smoking socialization eorts when smoking becomes more popular among young boys 15 Naturally, the alternative measures of smoking prevalence rates are correlated with each other, but there is still independent variation in the smoking prevalence rates across the dierent groups. See Table 11 for correlation coecients and Table 6 for means and standard deviations.
from which their children will want to distinguish themselves.
It is worth noting that both our theory and ndings contradict those produced by Patacchini and Zenou (2011), although they apply a comparable exercise to identify the cultural transmission mechanisms of preferences for education. Like our assumption that both smoker and non-smoker parents wish to transmit preferences against smoking to their children, Patacchini and Zenou assume that both educated and uneducated parents wish to transmit preferences in favor of education to their children. However, unlike our prediction that cultural complementarity is tied with cultural distinction, these authors predict that complementarity is tied with conformity. As we briey discuss in section 3, this prediction relies on their assumption that a high prevalence of education in society creates positive externatilities in the eectiveness of parental socialization eorts by decreasing socialization costs (e.g. because more educated neighbors can help a less educated parent to better socialize the children).
Their results support their theory. They nd that all parents socialize their kids in favor of education, that their socialization eort increases with the prevalence of educational attainment in the population residing in the same neighborhood and, at the same time, the neighborhood education level increases the probability that children acquire education.
Other mechanisms
Also relevant is that the theoretical predictions of Patacchini and Zenou rely on the assumption that educated parents are more eective in socializing their children than uneducated parents because they face lower cost of socialization. Our model necessitates no particular assumption about the mechanisms underlying the vertical transmission process of smoker versus non-smoker parents. On the contrary, it allows many mechanisms to be at work at the same time. For example, smoker and non-smoker parents may or may not dier in the eectiveness of their socialization eorts, in their tolerance of having children who smoke, in their perception of the health-risks of smoking, and other dimensions. Whether or not each of these scenaria is true is an empirical question.
The evidence we present in Table 9 already shed some light on this issue. We nd that never-smoker parents respond to the popularity of smoking in society by increasing their socialization eorts both more than eversmokers (column 1) and more than current and ex-smokers (column 2). Further, we nd that this dierence persists at all levels of information exposure (column 3). We present more evidence in Table 12 . There we show that never-smoker parents also have a higher responsiveness to health information both relative to ever smokers (column 1) and relative to current and ex-smokers (column 2). Both these ndings suggest that smoker and nonsmoker parents evaluate dierently the health risks that their children face when they smoke, and are consistent with existing empirical evidence that non-smokers tend to overestimate the impact of smoking on health (e.g. Table 12 we also show that never-smoker parents lower their socialization eorts when they work and increase their socialization eorts when their child is a rule-breaker less than ever-smokers (column 3 and 5, respectively). This may be because, unlike parents who smoke, never-smoker parents are more eective at socializing their kids to be non-smokers by setting the right example and can, therefore, aord to lower their socialization eorts when socialization cost increases or when they have reactive children. Somewhat at odds with this interpretation is our nding that the responsiveness to the socialization cost does not statistically dier between never-smokers and current smokers (column 4), whereas the responsiveness to having a reactive child does not statistically dier between never-smokers and ex-smokers (column 6).
Viscusi and Hakes 2008). In

6.4
Forward projections of the share of children who ever smoke
As a nal exercise, we simulate the dynamics of youth ever-smoking rates over time as described by equation (2) in section 3.5. To do this we use the estimated structural parameters from column 3 of Table 8 (i.e. our most restrictive specication), and the mean probability that a child ever smokes that we observe in our sample as the initial condition. This exercise serves two purposes. First and foremost, it shows that the smoking trait persists in the steady state of the population dynamics, it provides an estimate of the smoking rates at the steady state, and it provides an estimate of the time that smoking rates would need in order to adjust to that steady-state. Second, this exercise provides a framework that we can use to test how dierent policy regimes can aect the speed of adjustment of the youth smoking rates to equilibrium. We draw the projections in Figure 6 .
The solid line shows how the youth ever-smoking rates would fare in future generations all else equal. It indicates that the share of youth ever-smokers converges to a steady-state value just above 11 percent. This trajectory can be altered by a social planner via several policy instruments. Here we give the examples of`reasonable' increases in cigarette taxes and in parental socialization eorts during the lifetime of the children observed in our data. The dotted line shows how the smoking rates would fare under half a standard deviation increase in cigarette taxes (i.e. under a 0.27 dollar increase); and the dashed line shows how they would fare under half a standard deviation increase in the share of parents who socialize their children at least once a week (i.e. an increase of 9.8 percentage points). The former is an example of a policy that targets children directly, while the latter is an example of a policy that targets children indirectly, via parental behavior.
We nd that the proposed increase in taxes accelerates the rate of adjustment of youth ever-smoking rates so that 90 percent of the adjustment is achieved within two generations. In comparison, the proposed increase in socialization accelerates the rate of adjustment so that 90 percent of the adjustment is achieved within only one generation. Similarly, the increase in taxes reduces the rate of young smokers at the steady-state by 0. 8 16 Because we use our most restrictive specication to carry out the projections, our results are based on a sample size of 2074. The probability that the child ever smokes in this sample equals 19.6% (as opposed to the 18% reported in Table 1 ). Our results suggest that, in order to reach their equilibrium value, youth smoking rates need to drop by 8.6 percentage points (from 19.6% to 11%).
percentage points, whereas the increase in socialization reduces it by 1 percentage point. By no means, do we present these results to suggest that subsidizing parental socialization is a preferred tobacco control policy relative to a tax increase. Such a claim would require evidence on the cost of each policy regime. Rather, this evidence demonstrates that a policy maker has the tools to signicantly change both the steady-state smoking rates of young people and the speed of adjustment to that steady state. For example, Healthy People 2020 reports that 19.5 percent of adolescents in grades 9 through 12 smoked cigarettes in 2009 and sets the objective to reduce that percentage to 16 percent by 2020. The results we present in Figure 6 suggest that, by using the right policy regime, the government can achieve and even surpass that goal.
Conclusion
Building on the literature on cultural transmission, we develop a model of smoking dynamics that focuses on the role of parents and social norms; we use novel data to test its theoretical predictions; and we nd empirical support. Our paper advances the literature in several ways.
On the theory front, we extend the seminal work by Bisin and Verdier (2001) to provide a rationale for why traits rst emerge, why parents may change the traits they prefer to transmit to their children, and how long-term cultural heterogeneity can be achieved when that occurs. We argue that a cultural trait may emerge when a prot-maximizing industry promotes it, and the way people perceive that trait can be inuenced by the ow of related information. Thus, relative to the existing theory, we contribute a framework of analysis to study the transmission mechanisms of a wider variety of cultural traits. Specically, our model can be used to study (i) cultural traits that already exist and the way people perceive them does not change over time (e.g. preferences on education; trust; religion); (ii) cultural traits that already exist but the way people perceive them changes over time (e.g. preferences on smoking, polluting the environment, or women's rights); and (iii) cultural traits that are brand new (e.g. the culture of social networking). To date, the cultural transmission theory has focused on the traits in the rst category.
In developing our model, we introduce new mechanisms to characterize the cultural transmission process.
Specically, we relax a standard assumption in the cultural transmission theory that, when children adopt their traits from society, this happens via a (random or non-random) matching process. This matching process entails that the probability of acquiring a trait always increases with the prevalence of that trait in society. In our model, we allow the industry to aect the direction of this relationship. Borrowing terminology from the literature on identity formation, we formally dene the positive relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of that trait in society as cultural conformity. We show that conformity in the social channel of transmission is always tied to substitution in the parental channel of transmission, which posits that parents increase their socialization eorts the more prevalent their preferred cultural trait is in society, and is a cornerstone assumption in the literature. Conformity and substitution will co-exist because parents will lower their socialization eorts when their preferred trait becomes more popular among societal groups to which they know that their children will conform. Correspondingly, we formalize the assumption of cultural distinction to predict the opposite of cultural conformity; i.e. a negative relationship between the probability of adopting a trait and the prevalence of that trait in society. We show that distinction in the social channel of transmission is always tied to complementarity in the parental channel of transmission, which posits that parents decrease their socialization eorts the more prevalent their preferred cultural trait is in society. Distinction and complementarity will co-exist because parents will increase their socialization eorts when their preferred trait becomes more popular among societal groups from which they know that their children will distinguish themselves. We take all our theoretical predictions to U.S. data and we nd supporting evidence.
To test our model, we carefully account for the endogeneity of the parental socialization eorts using a novel measure of parental exposure to anti-smoking information as an instrument. We also avoid selection, simultaneity, and exogenous correlation bias in the estimated social eects by measuring smoking prevalence of the role-model population at the state-level, and including a full set of xed eects in our regression models. Thus, our empirical analysis contributes to the health economics literature causal estimates of parental and social inuences on youth smoking participation. Whether smoking behavior is transmitted through parents, role-models, or peers is relevant for designing tobacco control policy and anti-smoking campaigns. If children primarily pick up smoking from their parents, policies that target parental behavior may be more eective at preventing smoking onset than policies that target young people directly. If children primarily pick up smoking from the society, then this implies externalities that can lead to large dierences in smoking behavior through social-multiplier eects. On the one hand, social pressure can cause consumption to be sticky in the face of policy instruments; on the other hand, social inuences can complement government interventions to prevent smoking initiation among young people. Our results suggest that parental inuences are more important than social inuences in the transmission of the smoking trait, and they showcase the spread of anti-smoking information as a key instrument to lower smoking rates among young people.
Finally, we demonstrate how the cultural transmission theory can provide an analytical framework which policy makers can use to evaluate the long-term eects of tobacco control policies. Specically, we use our empirical results to project what will be the steady state rate of youth smoking in future generations. We show that the rate converges to a steady state in which smoking persists. But we also show that a policy maker can aect both the level of smoking at that steady state and the speed of adjustment to that steady state. Our projections suggest that, under the right policy regime, it is possible to achieve the youth smoking rate objectives set by Healthy People 2020. Proof of Proposition 2: By total dierentiation of (??), we get
> 0 i S (q) > 0, and the eect of an increase in smoking prevalence on the likelihood a child becomes a smoker can be expressed as
Proof of Proposition 3: In a subgame perfect equilibrium, the rm's objective function can be written as: 
In order to understand when cultural distinction vs. conformity arise, we need to study the sign of:
∂S(q,θ) ∂θ we have S < 0 under cultural complementarity, and so S (0) > 0 and S (1) < 1.
17 Our assumptions ensure that the second order condition satises
and so we have a concave problem whose solution can be recovered through the FOC.
Appendix II: Tables Rule breaker: the child did something dangerous, damaged public property, got in a ght, drove drunk or high over 10 times the last 6 months or that the child has been arrested or put in jail more than once to date or that the child has a lot of secrets or hides a lot of things from parents. Table 9 : Probit estimation of the probability that the child is socialized at least once/week AL  AR  AZ  CA  CO  CT  DC  DE  FL  GA  HI  IA  ID  IL  IN  KS  KY  LA  MA  MD  ME  MI  MN  MO  MS  MT  NC  ND  NE  NH  NJ  NM  NV  NY  OH  OK  OR  PA  RI  SC  SD  TN  TX  UT  VA  VT 
